Ten years after the financial crisis that announced the arrival of the "history of capitalism," the impact of this new scholarship remains uneven. "Capitalism" has certainly caught on as a focal point of debate, generating a steady stream of monographs, edited collections, conferences, manifestos, and critical assessments. This lively debate, however, has failed to crystalize any methodological consensus. It has also struggled to broaden the scope of inquiry beyond a few, and mostly U.S.-centered, topics. The effort to foster a broad conversation that would bring together scholars from separate fields and backgrounds, at least thus far, seems to have generated more friction than cooperation.
Bhu Srinivasan's Americana: A 400-Year History of American Capitalism, the least scholarly of the four books, is also most symptomatic of the tendency to use the history of capitalism as a new bottle for very old wine. A tech entrepreneur-turned-author, Srinivasan is an informed and lively narrator. He builds on work in business history to offer a fast-clipped narrative, moving through thirty-five "Next Big Things," from the Virginia Company, through Standard Oil and Henry Ford, to Apple and Facebook. As with many popular histories, the past in this account is emphatically not a foreign country. With terms drawn from the corporate world, capitalism is insinuated into American history as folklore, hence the book's title. The Virginia Company, we are told, was formed via "adventure capital" and had "an unlimited upside" (pp. 6-7). Slaves in the antebellum South were "the single most valuable asset class in America" (p. 126). Federal regulation under Theodore Roosevelt was not anti-business but merely helped "correct for excesses" in the market (p. 275).
Capitalism in the U.S., in this rendition, did not emerge over time but has been integral to American society from its inception. All major pivots or collisions in this history are subsumed under a relentless but ultimately benign process of invention and reinvention. The dark chapters-racial slavery, violent labor conflict, residential segregation-are not ignored, but neither are they allowed to cast more than a passing shadow on the overall arc of progress. The result typifies the sensibility of what Nancy Fraser has called progressive neoliberalism: forward-looking, pragmatic, and optimistic about markets. It tells an exceptionally American story of how entrepreneurs, with the helping hand of government (always in a supporting role), transformed the world time and time again. The only real enemy, it proposes, has been misguided dogmatism of any sort, of the libertarian or the socialist variety.
That Srinivasan so easily and unproblematically assimilates capitalism into the American past suggests that political economy and cultural methods have not yet made their way into the core of business history, despite considerable efforts to this effect in recent years. The notion that capitalism has always been as American as apple pie, not a historically specific and controversial formation, remains firmly in place. The attempt to rethink U.S. history in a global and comparative perspective, which has similarly been on the agenda of business historians, is also barely noticeable. How and why did the place of the United States in the world economy shift over time? This question never comes up in an account organized narrowly around a sequence of entrepreneurial breakthroughs. These critical perspectives will only gain traction as business history continues to broaden its agenda beyond economic actors in the marketplace to the market's political, social, and cultural underpinnings.
Peter Kolozi's Conservatives Against Capitalism: From the Industrial Revolution to Globalization offers a powerful corrective to the idea of capitalism as organic to American society. Capitalism, Kolozi shows, has in fact persistently troubled Americans, who viewed it, not as an established fact of American life, but as an external intrusion. Some of capitalism's most severe critics have come, however, not from the left, but from the right. Kolozi explores the work of conservative intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who saw capitalism as a threat to the stability of the core institutions of American society, especially church and family. He shows that anti-capitalism has been a recurring theme, maybe even a fundamental tenet, in conservative thought up to the recent past.
Unlike today, conservatives' chief commitment has historically not been to the reign of the free market. They saw cycles of economic transition not as welcome "disruptions" but as dangerous sources of social upheaval, empowering undeserving upstarts, sowing dangerous seeds of class conflict, and prioritizing mammon over god and country. Kolozi begins in the antebellum South, where John C. Calhoun, James Henry Hammond, and George Fitzhugh, blind to the horrors of their own slave society, were nevertheless keen critics of the market's "cold, hard, competitive, and calculating" compulsions (p. 37). Next in this lineage stood the pro-imperialists of the early twentieth century. Men such as Brooks Adams and Theodore Roosevelt determined to wrest power from what they viewed as the corrupt rule of the greed-driven "robber barons." They instead championed, not egalitarian democracy, but the restoration of a public-spirited and virile elite of "warrior-aristocrats." The Southern Agrarians of the 1920s and 1930s-John Crowe Ranson, Donald Davidson, Lawrence Owsley and others-sang the praises of the (largely invented) rootedness and humaneness of rural life. They lamented the alienation and exploitation attended upon farmers by the forces of financial and industrial capitalism (even as they endorsed Jim Crow segregation).
The Southern Agrarians directed their main critique at the market, rather than the government. They supported public utilities, progressive corporate taxation, and government regulation. They grasped the moderate nature of the New Deal and accommodated themselves to it. This orientation among conservatives survived into the Cold War era, when conservative thinkers such as Peter Viereck, Russell Kirk, and Robert Nisbet distanced themselves from laissez-faire capitalism, which they presented as the triumph of an atomizing liberalism and enemy of traditional society. Conservative criticism of capitalism, Kolozi argues, became "a shell of its former self" in the 1970s, as the welfare state supplanted corporate capitalism as the chief target (p. 141). Neglecting capitalist institutions, conservatives shifted their attention to a narrower cultural critique. Articulated by figures such as Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, this critique excoriated the hedonism of self-absorbed American consumerism, the decline of the Protestant work-ethic, and the inability of the market to inspire patriotism and moral courage in international affairs. The book ends with the more recent twist, the rise of the "paleoconservative" pushback against global capitalism. Espoused by Samuel Francis and Patrick Buchannan, among others, this line of attack indicted, not capitalism per se, but transnational corporate elites who sacrificed American manufacturing and American workers at the altar of "globalism," perfecting a rhetoric that proved highly successful in the presidential election of 2016.
Kolozi dedicates his pages to the elaboration of a key insight: conservatives have long identified capitalism as a revolutionary force that upturned existing arrangements, violating everything they ostensibly held dear. But his analysis stays strictly within the realm of intellectual history, missing an opportunity to pursue ideas into the realms of politics, business, or society. Conservative anti-capitalism, as far as we can tell in this account, rarely translated into actual practice or policy. Nor does the book deploy this intellectual tradition to push us to reconsider key turning points in American history. Instead, Kolozi embeds his reading of conservative texts in a conventional periodization, which is simply recapped in textbook form to begin and end each chapter. A history of ideas thus ironically reinforces the sense that capitalism evolved in an autonomous sphere, immune to social imperatives and ideological concerns.
A similar problem in a different vein is on display in Harry S. Stout's, American Aristocrats: A Family, a Fortune, and the Making of American Capitalism, which likewise fails to harness its insights to revise received wisdom. A multi-generation study of the Anderson family of Kentucky and Ohio, the book illuminates the strategies that allowed nineteenth-century elites to gain and maintain control over the political economy of the young United States. Based on meticulous research in the family's copious correspondence (among themselves and with many of the early Republic's shining lights), Stout weaves a fascinating, wide-ranging story that moves from Fort Sumter, Washington, D.C., and Harvard Yard, and to the Rocky Mountains, northern Mexico, and the Republic of Colombia.
The Andersons shed light on a much-neglected region that was nevertheless a focal point of American commercial expansion. Running askew of the traditional emphasis on "North" and "South," this family built its fortunes via land speculation on the western edges of American settlement. Cities that rarely make the cut in a typical survey-Dayton, Cincinnati, and Louisvilleappear here as strategic sites of violent expropriation, rapid influx of a white population, and the integration of vast territories into an American domain. Families like the Andersons were well positioned to derive fortunes from this process. "The creation of the 'self-made man,'" Stout shrewdly observes, "was not simply the work of one person but of a whole family system" (p. 93). Power in a democratizing republic rested on kinship networks and social connections. These were painstakingly forged at elite schools like William & Mary, West Point, and Harvard, and through deliberate intermarriage with other elite families, which members the Andersons especially excelled in. Stout revisits the history of the early Republic from an original and penetrating vantage point, but he ultimately denies his actors their due as important architects, rather than simply beneficiaries, of American capitalism. Capitalism, to the extent that it is analyzed in the book, appears as an abstract and inexorable force, rather than the creative project of clans like the Andersons. Stout instead submerges this fascinating family story in a generic and undifferentiated "American gospel of private property and accumulated wealth," casting the Andersons implausibly as stand-ins for a "landed middle class" or "middle-class elite." The Andersons dispel myths about social fluidity and equal opportunity in the so-called "era of the common man." They reveal capitalism-conservative anxieties of the type Kolozi examined notwithstanding-to be perfectly compatible with a hierarchical social structure. They also show it to be less of a revolution from below, driven by visionary entrepreneurs-as Srinivasan claims-but confidently presided over by established elites. All of this draws little comment from Stout, who seems thematically less interested in power than in the "roller coaster of emotion" associated with land speculation (p. xviii).
William Novak and Naomi Lamoreaux's Corporations and American Democracy, an edited collection of excellent essays, is the most self-consciously revisionist of the books, and also the only one that elides capitalism as an explicit framework. The introduction nevertheless sketches a radical recasting of the history of American capitalism as we have known it. Instead of a story that traces the rise of the private market forces, Novak and Lamoreaux propose a historical arc defined by sustained-and evolving-commitment to public authority over corporate power. Corporations, they argue, have been consistently held to "a higher standard of public care, public responsibility, and public accountability" than private individuals (p. 4). Yes, corporations have often found creative ways to evade public control. In return, however, public authorities have been imaginative and adaptable in forging new legal, administrative, and regulatory technologies to subject corporations to democratic control. In this sense, the Supreme Court's recent Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions-decisions that loom large over this volume-represent a radical departure from established presuppositions and practice. These decisions mark, not a return to an earlier era of unregulated capitalism, but an "unprecedented" (and hence potentially reversible) prioritization of corporate rights and protections.
Novak and Lamoreaux's language is refreshingly bold. Government power over business, they argue, has been the rule, not the exception. "Continuous, insistent, and rigorous forms of state intervention and regulation" has been nothing short of "the American Way" (p. 32). The implications of this could indeed be far reaching for a longstanding master narrative-not often challenged-that features the United States as the quintessential market society. Novak applies this framework in a groundbreaking chapter on the Gilded Age and Progressive Era that rejects the idea of the period as an era of laissez faire. Munn v. Illinois-the Supreme Court decision sanctioning state regulation of corporations, including the authority to set rates-he argues, did not mark the "last gasps of the well-regulated society," giving way to an era of constitutional limitations. It was, rather, a "superhighway down which reformers drove a truckload of far-reaching experiments in state regulation of new economic and business activity" (p. 172). The typical focus on a handful of conservative Supreme Court decisions, which emphasized the judiciary's "naysaying function," have distracted scholars from the numerous ways-"a sprawling disarray of litigation, ordinances, statues, franchises, and charters"-that political institutions, especially on the state level, proactively shaped economic life (pp. 175, 153) .
In Novak's view, the Progressive Era did not introduce government regulation into a free market system, as history surveys usually explain, but rather brought new technologies and a new level of coherence to this preexisting regulatory ecosystem. Novak unfortunately does not interrogate whether reform merely brought order to a disorganized regulatory regime, or more fundamentally changed the substance and goals of this system. This is emblematic of the volume's overall tendency, which, even as it greatly complicates the history of corporations, uses an ill-defined understanding of "American democracy," associated less with grassroots movements and more with activist lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. As Kolozi has shown, not all opposition to corporate power necessarily championed more democratic alternatives. Novak likewise misses an opportunity to explore what government activism might have meant for the rise of the industrial corporation, whose origins have been attributed (most notably by Alfred D. Chandler Jr.) precisely to the growth of an unregulated national market.
More significantly, the individual essays in the book are markedly less sanguine about the capacity of public authority to discipline corporations. This is in part because they do not follow Novak's lead toward state courts and legislatures, remaining mostly focused on the liberal Federal level. Daniel A. Crane's essay discusses failed efforts in the early twentieth century to enact Federal incorporation, which weakened (or at the very least complicated) the government's regulatory position vis-à-vis national corporations. Steven A. Bank and Ajay K. Mehrota explore the Federal corporate taxes as an instrument of regulation. The income tax indeed forced greater transparency on corporations and generated important government revenue, but they left unchallenged corporate autonomy in allocating investment. Margaret M. Blair and Elizabeth Pollman offer a sobering survey of the rights of corporations as interpreted by the Supreme Court, revealing a resilient tradition of treating corporations as associations of rights-bearing individuals. Jonathan Levy explores the blurry lines dividing "private" and "public" purpose in the postwar era, with the former gradually colonizing the latter, rather than the other way around. Bringing the story to the recent past, Nelson Lichtenstein's essay underscores savvy corporate ability to evade accountability via the restructuring of global supply chains.
The essays that do focus on the state level are even more at odds with the declared goals of the volume. Jessica L. Hennessey and John J. Wallis, collaboratively, and Eric Hilt trace, not ongoing government supremacy over corporations in the name of the public interest, but rather, the transition to general incorporation laws that replaced government oversight with "open access" to the corporate form. Democracy, in these essays, is perversely equated with the constraining of "political discretion" over incorporation, with the tying "of the hands of the political actors" (pp. 59, 96). The public interest is equated with unimpeded market access and free competition. Novak and Lamoreaux's revisionism may find more fruitful alliances among political and social historians, who are better equipped to expose the broad contours of the relationship between democracy and private corporate power, as well as what was at stake in the question of democratic jurisdiction over economic questions.
The history of capitalism, as a scholarly project, has not been without skeptics and detractors, who were quick to point out, in turn, its lack of theoretical clarity, laxness about empirics and methodology, overzealous commitment to Marxian orthodoxies (or not enough of it), and skepticism about cultural history. These critiques have all contained more than a grain of truth. Srinivasan, Kolozi, Stout, and Novak & Lamoreaux, however, demonstrate why the history of capitalism is nevertheless indispensable for any fresh rethinking of the political economy of the United States, and by implication, American history more generally. In casting capitalism as a historical backdrop, rather than an interpretive framework for their inquiries, the books betray a widespread tendency to assume rather than interrogate large-scale change. Despite remarkable insights, they unwittingly reproduce entrenched tropes that have long associated American capitalism with heroic entrepreneurs, liberal markets, economic determinism, and the ineluctable forces of modernization.
Only a more interdisciplinary approach can dispel the power of these metanarratives and allow for creative reconsideration of American capitalism in more historically specific terms. This will necessarily involve a broad framework-call it what we will, perhaps the "history of capitalism"?-that would examine collective social mobilizations, culture and ideological commitments, the formation of legal and political institutions, and initiative in the marketplace, on a shared plane of analysis. These different spheres must be thought of not as separate and discrete, but as interlocking yet partially autonomous aspects of the same history, shaping capitalism and, in turn, being reshaped by it. Brought together in this integrated way, they would allow us to reconceive of the political economy of the United States, not simply as a sequence that unfolded according to more-or-less predictable historical stages, but much more dynamically, as the outcome of intersections and collisions of competing social, political, entrepreneurial, legal, and ideological agendas, with results that have not been predetermined or clear-cut. In sum, this framework would allow a fully politicized account of economic life, one that is perhaps challenging to construct, but that nonetheless remains urgently in need.
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